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IV.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

This appeal arises from a summary judgment for Defendants, The Board of
County Commissioners of Salt Lake County ("the Board") and Commissioners Randy
Horiuchi and Brent Overson as individuals. The appeal presents important issues of
appellate jurisdiction, the extent to which parties are bound by their attorneys1
unqualified and on-the-record statements addressed to and relied upon by the Court
and opposing parties, and absolute legislative immunity. In bringing this vexatious and
groundless appeal, Plaintiffs have repeatedly and egregiously misstated the procedural
history of this case and have involved the individual commissioners despite their
absolute legislative immunity and the fact iha* no claims were ever property rr^de
against tnem. Commissioners Randy Horsuchi ana Brent Overscn, therefore,
respectfully request oral argument.
V.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This case on its face meets the jurisdictional requirements of 78-2-2(4) and 782a-3(2)(j) of the Utah Code. However, pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, this Court lacks jurisdiction because Plaintiffs filed their notice of
appeal of the trial court's April 14, 1995 order en September 27, 1S95, over four months
beyond the jurisdictional deadline.

VI1.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Does the Plaintiffs' four-month delay in filing a notice of appeal preclude

this court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal?
a.

The standard of review for this issue is de novo since it involves a

question solely of this Court's jurisdiction to consider this appeal. See Glezos v.
Frontier Investments, 896 P.2d 1230, 1232-34 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

2.

Does the trial court's January 30, 1995 order from the bench prohibiting

Plaintiffs from amending the complaint to add damage claims require this Court to affirm
the trial court's ruling as to damage claims asserted in violation of that order?
a.

Plaintiffs have not challenged the January 30, 1995 order either in

their notice of appeal or their brief. Nevertheless, a trial court's decision to grant or
deny a motion to amend is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of review.
Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co.. 854 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Mountain
Am. Credit Union v. McClellan. 854 P.2d 590, 592 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. 862
P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993).
3.

Did the on-the-record statement of Plaintiffs' counsel that "we are not

attacking that ordinance in the .amended pomplajnt," and his silence when tne trial court
later stated that Plaintiffs did not seek to invalidate the vacation ordinance, justiiy The
trial court's dismissal of the claims relating to the vacation ordinance?
a.

The standard of review for this issue snould take into account the

trial court's superior position in observing the demeanor, tone, and context incident to
the open-court waiver by Plaintiffs' counsel. u[T]he trial judge has observed 'facts ' such
as [counsel's] appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that
cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to appellate courts." State v.
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994). Thus, a measure of deference should be
accorded the trial court's ruling.
4.

Should the triai court's ruling as to the individual commissioners be

affirmed because, under the Utah Constitution, they are absolutely immune from
lawsuits arising out of their legislative role in passing the vacation ordinance?
a.

The standard of review of this issue is de novo. The

commissioners need not have raised the issue before the trial court. First, this Court
may affirm the trial court's ruling on any ground, even one not relied upon by the trial

9

court. Higqins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 240-41 (Utah 1993); Branch v.
Western Petroleum, Inc.. 657 P.2d 267, 276 (Utah 1982). Moreover, the individual
commissioners did not raise their absolute legislative immunity defense in reliance upon
the statements of Plaintiffs' counsel and the trial court that the Plaintiffs would not
pursue damage claims and claims challenging the validity of the vacation ordinance.
Thus, the commissioners had neither the need nor the opportunity to raise the defense.
4 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 267 (1993); cf. State v. Hovater. 914 P.2d 37,40 (Utah 1996)
(ruling thai ineffective assistance of counsel claim need not be raised in trial court).
Also, this Court should review this issue because the substantial constitutional rights of
the commissioners are at stake, and the record contains all the underlying facts
necessary for the issue's resolution. 4 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 267 (1993).
VII.

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY

Article VI, Section 8 of the Utah Constitution.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-14.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15.
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Neerinqs v. Utah State Bar 817 P.2d 320 (Utah 1991).
Morgan v. Morgan, 875 P.2d 563 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah
1994).
VIII.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION
IN COURT BELOW.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment awarded to the Board and the

individual commissioners in a lawsuit arising out of an ordinance that partially vacated a
roadway adjacent to the Plaintiffs' property. The order on appeal, signed and entered
by the trial court on April 14, 1995, states that

[Plaintiffs' claims as contained within [Plaintiffs' second
amended complaint, relating to that certain Salt Lake County
Ordinance as passed by the Board of Salt Lake County
Commissioners, to-wit, ordinance number 1275 (corrected),
dated August 10, 1995, . . . [the vacation ordinance], be and
the same are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
(R. at 648.) The trial court also dismissed a number of Plaintiffs' claims without
prejudice. (R. at 647-49.) None of the claims dismissed without prejudice, however,
are at issue on appeal. (R. at 703-08.)
On June 20, 1994, Plaintiffs filed a Verified Complaint against the Board and the
commissioners seeking to invalidate an ordinance passed by the Board at a public
hearing on May 25, 1994. (R. at 1-9.) The ordinance vacated an eight foot wide
portion of North Union Avenue and permanently closed, but did not vacate, the
remaining twenty-five foot wide section of the road running in front of Plaintiffs' property.
(R. at 379-80.) According to Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint, the vacation and closing of
Nortn Union Avenue improperly restricted access to their properties. (R. at 6-7.)
Therefore, in addition to seeking the invalidation of the vacation ordinance, Plaintiffs
also sought to enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance. (R. at 7-8.) No damage claims
against any of the Defendants were asserted.
The Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on July 14, 1994. (R. at 89-101.) The
only amendment involved a claim that the Defendants, in violation of statutory
provisions regarding road vacations, failed to provide proper notice to Plaintiffs that they
intended to vacate and close part of North Union Avenue. (R. at 91-95.) Again, no
damage claims against any of the Defendants were asserted.
On July 13, 1994, the Board signed and published a vacation ordinance that
varied from the May 25, 1994 vote, the decision on which Plaintiffs predicated their
Verified and Amended Complaints. (R. at 481-85.) On July 13, 1994, the ordinance as
published, Ordinance No. 1270, provided for a twenty-five foot wide public roadway to
give access to Plaintiffs' properties. (R. at 481-85.) The Ordinance provided that the
A

Plaintiffs "wilt still have direct access to 7240 South and will be provided additional
access to the north side of the properties from 7240 South through a 25 foot wide public
right-of-way." (R. at 159.) On August 10, 1994, the Board signed and published the
vacation ordinance in its final form, Ordinance No. 1275, which made only technical
changes to the previous ordinance. (R. at 157-60.)
On November 23,1994, Plaintiffs changed their position and sought to enforce
the vacation ordinance and, for the first time, to include claims for damages. (R. at 18283, 185.) On that day, Plaintiffs moved to file a Second Amended Complaint
maintaining the same claims and allegations as the earlier complaints but adding
damage claims and a claim for an injunction based upon the Defendants1 alleged failure
tc enforce county ordinances. (R. at 185.) One of the ordinances the Defendants were
alleged in the proposed Second Amended Complaint to have violated was the very
ordinance Plaintiffs had sought to invalidate. (R. at 185, 211, 221-23.) The other
ordinance Defendants were alleged to have violated was Ordinance No. 1186 which
provides guidelines for roadway development. (R. at 185, 221-23, 397-411.) According
to Plaintiffs, the public right-of-way described in Ordinance No. 1275 did not meet the
standards for roadways set forth by the Board in Ordinance No. 1186. (R. at 221-23.)
Thus, while the proposed Second Amended Complaint maintained Plaintiffs' claims
challenging the validity of the vacation ordinance, it also demanded the vacation
ordinance be enforced and enforced according to guidelines promulgated for roadway
development. (R. at 219-20, 221-24.)
Although Plaintiffs filed their motion to file a Second Amended Complaint on
November 23, 1994, they did not file their necessary Notice of Claim until almost a
month later. Under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, a claimant must give notice
to the governmental entity of her intention to file a damage claim against it before she

actually files a claim. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11. In this case, Plaintiffs filed their
Notice of Claim on December 19, 1994. (R. at 793-95.)
The inconsistency within Plaintiffs' proposed Second Amended Complaint
caused by challenging the vacation ordinance on the one hand and seeking its
enforcement on the other was resolved on January 30, 1995, when the trial court held a
hearing to discuss various issues including Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file their
proposed Second Amended Complaint. (R.at 820.) On the record, the Plaintiffs'
attorney acknowledged and resolved the inconsistency by stating that since so much of
the development and construction of the shopping center had affected North Union
Avenue following the Board's decision to vacate the roEO, the Plaintiffs-were r»c ionger
seeking the invalidation of that ordinance:
The reason we are here before you today, your Honor,, is nol
to attack the ordinance. While the original complaint may
have those allegations in it, your Honor, it is a mess out
there. And what we are here today is [sic] asking the county
to enforce its own ordinance.
(R. at 840.) Later, counsel for Defendants sought confirmation from the trial court that
Plaintiffs were no longer seeking to invalidate the vacation ordinance: "As I see the
second amended complaint they are going to be filing another version of i t . . . wherein,
as I understand it, they do not seek to invalidate the ordinance, am I correct?" (R. at
843 ) The trial court responded, "That's what was represented." (R. at 843.) The trial
court also confirmed that "that issue is dead." (R. at 843.) At no time during this
clarification did Plaintiffs' attorney object or otherwise contradict the trial court's
statements. (R. at 843.)
The court also disposed of the damage claims in the proposed Second Amended
Complaint by ordering that such claims could not be included. Defendants argued that,
under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, the Plaintiffs could not assert such claims
before ninety days had passed from the date Plaintiffs served their Notice of Claim. (R.

at 202, 838-39.) See Utah Code Ann § 63-30-14. Since the Plaintiffs filed their Notice
of Claim no earlier than December 19,1994, (R. at 838-39, 793-95), the earliest that
Plaintiffs could assert damage claims, was March 19, 1995. (R. at 839.) The trial court
agreed and stated, "You will not be able to amend until that 90 days expires pending
whatever the county wishes to do." (R. at 842 43.) 1 In addition, after confirming that
claims relating to the vacation ordinance were "dead;" the trial court said, "Plus I have
told them they would amend to not include damages and so only as to the injunctive
relief as to have the county enforce its own ordinance, that will be the limitations on the
amendments." (R. at 843.) After the trial court had ordered Plaintiffs to omit their
damage claims from the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs' counsel responded,
"No problem." (R. at 843.)
On February 10, 1995, the trial*court signed an older aiicwmg Plaintiffs to fiie
their Second Amended Complaint. <R. at 294-95.) The orae? did not change the trial
court's oral ruling prohibiting Plaintiffs from filing their proposed damage claims and
vacation ordinance claims. (R. at 294-95.) Thus, following the January 30, 1995
hearing and the February 10, 1995 order, Plaintiffs7 only remaining claim was for an
injunction. (R. at 842-43.) No appeal was ever filed challenging the trial court's ruling
on the Motion to Amend.
In their appellate brief, Plaintiffs misrepresent and mis-cite the record with regard
to the trial court's January 30, 1995 ruling. Citing the January 30, 1995 hearing
transcript at page 843, Plaintiffs state that during that hearing, the trial court "then ruled
that plaintiffs could file their Second Amended Complaint as submitted." (Brf. of
Appellants at 5, 12.) This statement is patently untrue. The trial court specifically ruled
that the issue regarding the vacation ordinance was "dead." (R. at 843.) In addition,
the trial court ruled that Plaintiffs "will not be able to amend until that 90 days expires
1

Plaintiffs never filed a complaint for damages following the ninety-day waiting period. Therefore, under
Section 63-30-15(2) of the Utah Code, which directs such claims to be filed "within one year after the
denial period . . . has expired," Plaintiffs are forever barred from asserting those claims.

pending whatever the county wishes to do," and that Plaintiffs "would amend to not
include damages and so only as to the injunctive relief as to have the county enforce its
own ordinance." (R. at 842-43.)
On February 13, 1995, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint that violated
the limitations ordered by the trial court and induced by Plaintiffs' counsel. (R. at 296311.) Despite the open-court statement by Plaintiffs' counsel and the trial court's order
that such claims would not be included, the Second Amended Complaint contained
language seeking to invalidate the vacation ordinance and seeking damages on the
basis of the Defendants' alleged failure to enforce the vacation ordinance and the
roadway development ordinance. (R,;at 304-08, 309.)
This fact highlights another misstatement in Plaintiffs' brief to this Court. In
paragraph 24 of Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts, Plaintiffs assert tnat when they filed their
Second Amended Complaint on February 13, 1995; that was uthe first time [Plaintiffs]
notified the court of [Plaintiffs' intention to seek botn compensatory and punitive
damages." (Brf of Applts. at 12.) Nothing couid be further from the truth. In their
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint filed on
November 23, 1994, Plaintiffs stated "[t]hat as a result of such violation, the Plaintiffs
have sustained considerable damages, which were not plead [sic] in the complaints
filed heretofore [sic]." (R. at 185.) Also, Plaintiffs first filed their proposed Second
Amended Complaint which contained the proposed damage claims on December 9,
1994. (R. at 211-26.) Moreover, as discussed above, Plaintiffs' proposed damage
claims was a hot topic of discussion at the January 30, 1995 hearing on Plaintiffs'
proposed Second Amended Complaint. (R. at 836-39, 842-43.) In addition, at a
March 29, 1995 hearing, Plaintiffs admitted that their damages claims were discussed
and prohibited. Plaintiffs' counsel stated to the trial court
I think . . . you . . . has [sic] acknowledged that we were
going to ask for damages in the amended complaint....
[W]e acknowledged that perhaps some of our claims were
8

not ripe at that point pursuant to the statute, and giving
notice to the county of damages that we perceived we had
incurred.
(R. at 895.) Thus, Plaintiffs' assertion in their brief that February 13, 1995 was the first
date on which they communicated their intention to assert damage claims is
disingenuous at best.
In response to Plaintiffs' violation of the trial court's order, Defendants objected in
their Answer filed on February 27,1994: ."[Plaintiffs' counsel, admitted in open Court,
that in obtaining permission by the Court . . . to file their second amended complaint,
[P]laintiffs did not and would not assail the validity, and passage of the Vacation'
ordinance. It was based upon that representation that the Court allowed [Pjlaintiffs to
file the [S]econd [A]mended[C]omplaint." (R. at 317.) In addition, on February 27,
1995, Defendants filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the alternative, a
Motion for Summary Judgment, seeking the dismissal of Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint, including the challenges to the vacation ordinance and the damage claims.
(R. at 326, 333-34.) Defendants submitted affidavits in support of their motion. (R. at
329-74.) Defendants argued that the challenges to the vacation ordinance had been
waived by the Plaintiffs. (R. at 878-79, 880-82.) In addition, Defendants reminded the
trial court that it had ordered the Plaintiffs "'to amend to not include damages.'" (R. at
879.) Again, at the March 29, 1995 hearing on Defendants' motion, Plaintiffs' counsel
admitted that the trial court had not allowed Plaintiffs to assert their damage claims. (R.
at 895.)
The trial court agreed with Defendants' counsel and granted their motion. (R. at
922-23.) At the March 29, 1995 hearing, the trial court, relying upon the January 30,
1995 hearing transcript, dismissed the claims challenging the vacation ordinance with
prejudice and requested that Defendants' counsel prepare an order for the trial judge's
signature. (R. at 879, 883, 922-23.)

On April 1, 1995, Defendants' counsel mailed a proposed order to Plaintiffs'
counsel. (R. at 647-49.) Pursuant to Rule 4-504(2) of the Code of Judicial
Administration, Plaintiffs filed an objection to the proposed order on April 10, 1995. (R.
at 639-40.) On April 14, 1995, Defendants submitted a "Notice of Submission of Order"
requesting the trial court to sign the submitted order and placing the Plaintiffs' objection
again before the trial court: "In a letter dated April 4, 1995, [Plaintiffs' counsel advised
the undersigned that he was unwilling to approve the order as submitted on the basis
that the cCourt did not dismiss Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice.'" (R. at 644-46.) On the
same day, the trial court signed the submitted order, dismissing Plaintiffs' vacation
ordinance claims with prejudice and effectively disposing of Plaintiffs' April 10 objection.
(R. at 647-49.)
On July 12, 1995, Plaintiff Meibos filed a motion for a ruling on Plaintiffs' April 10
objection to the proposed order. (R. at 656-58.) On September 26. 1995, the trial court
signed an order disposing of Plaintiffs' objection. (R. at 701-02.) At a hearing held to
discuss the issue, however, the trial court stated that its order could have no impact on
the timeliness of Plaintiffs' appeal. (R. at 857.)
On September 27, 1995, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal stating that Plaintiffs
seek review only of the trial court's order dismissing their claims relating to the vacation
ordinance with prejudice, (R. at 706-07), which was signed and entered on April 14,
1994.
The appeal was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of
Appeals pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4) of the Utah Code. Defendants moved for the
dismissal of the appeal on the basis of Plaintiffs' failure to comply with the jurisdictional
thirty-day time limit of Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. (Dfdt's Mem.
of Pts. and Auth's In Supp. of Dfdt's Mot. to Dismiss Pltfs Appeal at 2.) In response,
Plaintiffs asserted that in their April 10 objection, "[they] objected to the dismissal of the

vacation ordinance claim with prejudice, pursuant to Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure." (Applt's Memo, in Supp. of Mot. in Opp. to Applees Second Mot. to
Dismiss at 4.) Plaintiffs also argued that since their Rule 52(b) motion tolled the time to
file an appeal until after the trial court ruled on the motion, their notice was timely filed.
(jdL at 4-5.) The Court reserved judgment on the issue and instructed the parties to
raise the matter, along with the merits of the appeal, in their briefs to the Court.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

The Plaintiffs are owners of real property adjacent to a portion of North Union
Avenue. (R. at 1-2.) On February 15, 1994, Hermes Associates, Ltd, ("Hermes*) filed
a p etition for Street Vacation, seeking to vacate North Union Avenue to make way for
the expansion of a shopping center. (R. at 489, 490.) Hermes filed the petition as
owners of land abutting North Union Avenue. (R. at 489.) Fort Union Associates later
became the owner of such land. (R. at 347)
The Board published notices of a hearing to be held on the proposed vacation
ordinance, and on May 25, 1994, a hearing was held. (R. at 347, 473-80.) At the
hearing, Plaintiffs' counsel appeared and participated. (R. at 476-80.) Despite
counsel's protests, the Board voted 2-1, with commissioners Horiuchi and Overson in
the majority, to vacate an eight foot wide portion of North Union Avenue. (R. at 480.)
The Board also decided to close a twenty-five foot wide portion of the road running
directly in front of Plaintiffs' properties. (R. at 479-80.) However although the
ordinances as published, Ordinance No. 1270 and 1275 (corrected), did vacate the
eight foot wide portion of North Union Avenue and deeded that portion to Fort Union
Associates, contrary to what Plaintiffs initially thought would occur, both Ordinance No.
1270 and No. 1275 created a twenty-five foot public roadway to provide Plaintiffs direct
access to their properties. (R. at 157-60, 481-85.) This road was eventually
designated as 1070 East.

IX.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs' appeal must be dismissed because this Court lacks jurisdiction. Rule
4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appelate Procedure directs that a notice of appeal must be
filed within thirty days of the order appealed from. In this case, Plaintiffs appeal the
April 14, 1995 order. However, they filed their notice of appeal on September 27, 1995,
over four months beyond the jurisdictional deadline. Moreover, no post-judgment
motion was filed tolling the time to file the Notice of Appeal.
With regard to Plaintiffs' damage claims, the trial court's order must be affirmed
on the ground that Plaintiffs never challenged the trial court's January 30,1995 ruling
prohibiting Plaintiffs from amending the Amended Complaint to file those claims. The
trial court based its ruling on Section 63-30-14 of the Utah Code which states that no
damage claims may be filed before the governmental entity has had ninety days in
which to approve or deny the purported claims. Although Plaintiffs violated and ignored
the trial court's order and purported'to include damage claims in the Second Amended
Complaint anyway, they never challenged the court's denial of the motion to amend to
add those claims. Therefore, the trial court's ruling as to damage claims is the law of
the case, and this court should affirm the dismissal of Plaintiffs' damage claims
The dismissal of the Plaintiffs' challenges relating to the vacation ordinance, and
any damage claims attendant thereto, must be affirmed on the basis of Plaintiffs' waiver
of those claims. First, Plaintiffs, through counsel exp>essly waived those claims in
open court. They invited the trial court and opposing counsel to believe that there were
no such claims. Plaintiffs cannot now be heard to complain about a ruling brought
about by their own statements and conduct. Moreover, Defendants relied upon
Plaintiffs' open court waiver to their detriment. Had Plaintiffs not waived their vacation
ordinance claims, Defendants would have asserted defenses and would have provided
strong arguments as to why the vacation ordinance was valid.

Finally, the commissioners are immune from Plaintiffs' claims under the Speech
and Debate Clause of the Utah Constitution. Under a nearly identical federal
constitutional provision, legislators, including county legislators, have been held
absolutely immune by eleven United States Circuit Courts of Appeal from claims* arising
out of their legislative functions. This Court should also apply that doctrine to immunize
the commissioners under the corresponding provision in the Utah Constitution.
X.
A.

ARGUMENT

THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER PLAINTIFFS1 APPEAL
BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS FILED THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL OVER FOUR
MONTHS BEYOND RULE 4(a)'S THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE.
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:
In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right
from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of
appeal. . . shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within
30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order
appealed from.

This rule is jurisdictional, meaning that if an appeai is not filed within the thirty-day time
limit, the appellate court cannot take jurisdiction. Nielson v. Guriey, 888 P.2d 130, 132
(Utah Ct. App. 1994).
In this case, the order appealed from is the April 14, 1995 order dismissing the
Plaintiffs' claims relating to the vacation ordinance with prejudice. Thus, Plaintiffs had
until May 14v 1995 to file a notice of claim. Plaintiffs, however, filed their notice of claim
on September 27, 1995, over four months beyond the jurisdictional time limit.
Plaintiffs' April 10, 1995 objection did not toll the time to file a notice of appeal.
Plaintiffs argue that their April 10, 1995 objection was actually a motion "pursuant to
Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." (Applt's Memo, in Supp. of Mot. in
Opp. to Applee's Mot. to Dismiss at 4.) Such a motion invites trial courts to "amend its
findings or make additional findings" of fact. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b); Utah R. App. P. 4(b).
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However, such a motion submitted in response to the granting of summary judgment
does not toll the time for an appeal.
In Neerings v. Utah State Bar, 817 P.2d 320 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme
Court was confronted with whether appellant's Rule 52 motion effectively tolled the time
to file a notice of appeal of summary judgment, id, at 322. Appellant argued that his
motion, although unclear, was a Rule 52(b) motion which, under Rule 4(b) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, tolls the thirty-day time limit until the motion is resolved
by the trial court. Id, The appellee, on the other hand argued that since the order
appealed from was one for summary judgment, appellant's motion could not have been
brought under 52(b) but instead was a Rule 52(a) motion requesting the court to set
forth the basis for its award of summary judgment Id... The Utah Supreme Court
concluded that "whether [appellant's] motion was couched in terms of Rule 52(a) or
52(b) makes no significant difference in the resolution of the issue presented.'
Neerings, 817 P.2d at 322. The court held that following a summary judgment award,
neither a Rule 52(a) nor a 52(b) motion tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal JdL at
322-23. Consequently, the court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal,
id, at 323
This case is controlled by Neerings v. Utah State Bar. Plaintiffs now frame their
April 10, 1995 objection as a Rule 52(b) motion However, even if it were a Rule 52(b)
motion, seeking additional or amended findings of fact, it could have had no impact on
the trial court's summary judgment since "findings of fact are unnecessary in connection
with summary judgment decisions." Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 168 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989). Thus, Plaintiffs' "motion" did not toll the time for filing their notice of
appeal. Neerings, 817 P.2d at 322-323.
In any event, the Plaintiffs' classification of their April 10, 1995 objection is pure
revisionism. What the Plaintiffs filed was an objection to a proposed order pursuant to
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Rule 4-504(2) of the Code of Judicial Administration. Such an objection is not listed in
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure as a type of filing that tolls the time
for appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 4(b).2 In fact, the Plaintiffs' objection could not even
be considered a motion since, under Rule 7(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
it is not "[a]n application to the court for an order" See United States v. Conservation
Chem. Co., 106 F.R.D. 210, 227 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (stating that an objection, rather than
an application for relief or other order, does not constitute a motion within the meaning,
of Rule 7(b)(1)).
This Court has ruled that the type of objection at issue is effectively overruled
when the trial court signs and enters the proposed order, in Morgan v. Morgan, 875
P.2d 563 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994), this Court ruled that
despite the existence of objections to a proposed order that were not expressly
addressed, the signing ot the order became the final order to appeal. "The objections
were before the trial court; therefore, we believe the court implicitly denied plaintiffs
objections." \jL at 564-65 n. 1; see also Zions First Nat'l Bank v. C'Est Bon Venture,
613 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah 1980) (holding that an oral motion was effectively denied by a
later judgment despite the fact that after the judgment, the trial court reconsidered the
motion).
In this case, by signing the proposed order after the Plaintiffs' objection was filed,
the trial court effectively and implicitly overruled their objection. Plaintiffs' objection was
filed four days before the entry of the trial court's final order, and Defendants' notice of
submission again alerted the trial court to both the existence and substance of Plaintiffs'
objection. Consequently, the time for filing an appeal commenced running at the time

2

Rule 4(b) provides
If a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by
any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make
additional findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be
required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or
(4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the
entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motions.

the order was entered, April 14, 1995. The Plaintiffs' September 27, 1995 notice is
therefore untimely, and this Court lacks jurisdicticn to consider Plaintiffs appeal.
B.

THIS COURT MUST AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF
PLAINTIFFS5 DAMAGE CLAIMS BECAUSE SUCH CLAIMS WERE
PROHIBITED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN A RULING THAT HAS GONE
UNCHALLENGED BY THE PLAINTIFFS AND, IN ANY EVENT, IS
SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE BASES. "
Under the doctrine of "law of the case," a trial court ruling from which no appeal

has been taken cannot be challenged and must be appiied by the appellate court.
"Failure to perfect an appeal goes to the jurisdiction of this Court. Where the denial of a
motion ..... or any other final ruling or order of the trial court, goes unchallenged by
appeal, such becomes the law of the case, and is not thereafter subject to later
challenge." Tracy v. University of Utah Hosp., 6 «9 P.2d 340, 342 (Utah 1930) (footnote
omitted).
In this case, Plaintiffs failed to appeal from the trial court's order that was
explained at the January 30, 1995 hearing and signed and entered on February 10,
1995. That order forbade Plaintiffs from amending their Amended Complaint by adding
damage claims against Defendants within ninety days of their December 19, 1994
Notice of Claim. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-14. This meant that no damage claims
could be filed until March 19, 1995. Although Plaintiffs violated this order by purporting
to assert such claims on February 13, 1995, they never challenged the order.
Therefore, under the doctrine of law of the case, this Court must apply the trial court's
ruling of January 30 and February 10, 1995, to affirm the dismissal of Plaintiffs' damage
claims.
Even if Plaintiffs could challenge the trial court's ruling prohibiting the assertion of
damages claims, Plaintiffs would have to overcome a heavy burden. This ruling was
made on Plaintiffs' motion to amend their Amended Complaint. Such rulings can only
be reversed by showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Kleinert v. Kimball
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Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Mountain America Credit
Union v McClellan. 854 P.2d 590, 592 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. 862 P.2d 1356
(Utah 1993). Thus, the trial court's ruling must be upheld if any reasonable basis exists
to support it. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993).
In this case, reasonable bases exist to support the trial court's ruling. First, as
the trial court stated, Plaintiffs' damage claims were not ripe. Under Section 63-30-14
of the Utah Code, claimants may not file a claim against a governmental entity until
ninety days have passed since they served a notice of claim. In this case, ninety days
had not elapsed. Moreover, Plaintiffs admitted that their claims were not ripe. Plaintiffs'
counsel agreed that "the 90 days [had] not expired." (R at 842, 895.) Thus, it can
hardly be said that no reasonable basis existed to support the partial denial of Plaintiffs'
Motion to Amend.
C

THE TRIAL COURT S DISMISSAL OF THE CLAIMS RELATING TO THE
VACATION ORDINANCE MUST BE AFFIRMED ON THE GROUND THAT
PLAINTIFFS OPENLY WAIVED THOSE CLAIMS AND PLAINTIFFS SHOULD
NOT BE ALLOWED TO GAIN FROM JUDICIAL ACTION THEY INVITEE/ ~
The Plaintiffs affirmatively waived their declarative, injunctive, and damage

claims relating to the vacation ordinance when their attorney stated to the trial court and
opposing counsel that Plaintiffs were no longer pursuing those claims. In addition,
Plaintiffs should not be allowed to appeal the trial court's dismissal of such claims,
assuming such dismissal was error, when the Plaintiffs invited such error by leading the
court and counsel to believe that such claims were waived.
Waiver is "'the intentional relinquishment of a known right.'" Soter's. Inc. v.
Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 939-40 (Utah 1993) (quoting Rees v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1991)). Waiver requires (1) an
existing right, benefit, or advantage; (2) knowledge of its existence; and (3) an intention
to relinquish the right, | d at 940. Civil litigants are bound by the statements and
conduct of their attorneys. Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-32(2); In re Caraill. Inc.. 66 F.3d
17

1256, 1261 (1st Cir. 1995); Russell v. Martell. 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984);
Walker v.Carlson. 740 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Plaintiffs do not dispute
the satisfaction of the first two elements of waiver. Plaintiffs apparently believe they
have a right to bring claims against Defendants relating to the vacation ordinance and
have known of such a right since they filed their Verified Complaint on June 20, 1994.
In addition, it can hardly be denied that Plaintiffs manifested an intention to
relinquish a right to maintain claims regarding the vacation ordinance. At the January
30, 1995 hearing on whether Plaintiffs should be allowed to file a Second Amended
Complaint, Plaintiffs' counsel stated:
The reason we are here before you today; your Honor, is not
to attack the ordinance While the original complaint may
have those allegations in it. your Honor, it is a mess out
there. And what we are here today is [sic] asking the county
to enforce its own ordinance.
(R. at 840.) After Defendants' counsel stated, "As I see the second amended complaint
they are going to be filing another version of it. . . wherein, as ! understand it, they do
not seek to invalidate the ordinance," the trial court responded, That's what was
represented." (R. at 843.) Moreover, the trial court confirmed that "that issue is dead."
(R. at 843.) At no time during this exchange did Plaintiffs' counsel object or otherwise
alter the perception that Plaintiffs were waiving their claims relating to the vacation
ordinance.
This is also the reason why Plaintiffs' argument under Rule 52(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure is groundless. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court violated
Rule 52(a) by not specifying the grounds upon which it based its award of summary
judgment. However, Plaintiffs themselves supplied the sole basis for the trial court's
dismissal of their vacation ordinance claims. At the January 30, 1995 hearing, Plaintiffs
openly and affirmatively stated that they were no longer pursuing vacation ordinance
claims. Thus, it is highly disingenuous for Plaintiffs to now argue that the trial court's
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subsequent dismissal of those claims came as a surprise to Plaintiffs, and that Plaintiffs
have no idea as to why the court so ruled.
This Court should affirm the trial court's ruling because Plaintiffs led the trial
court to believe they were no longer pursuing vacation ordinance claims. It is a longstanding principle that "a party who takes a position which either leads a court into error
or by conduct approves the error committed by the court, cannot later take advantage
of such error in procedure." Ludlow v. Colorado Animal By-Prods. Co., 137 P.2d 347,
354 (Utah 1943); see also Butler, Crocket and Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline
Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225, 235 (Utah 1995); Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d
265, 270 (Utah 1995).
In this case, Plaintiffs led the court into the alleged error and by ;:heir own
conduct approved such error. First Plaintiffs, through counsel, declared in open court
that they were no longer pursuing claims related to the vacation ordinance. Second,
when the trial court confirmed that Plaintiffs were no longer challenging the ordinance
and that "that issue is dead," (R. at 843), Plaintiffs approved the trial court's conclusion
by remaining silent and failing to object.
This Court should look askance upon Plaintiffs' strategy of leading the trial court
and opposing parties to believe that Plaintiffs were no longer pursuing vacation
ordinance claims. The trial court relied upon Plaintiffs' waiver by dismissing those
claims with prejudice. Defendants relied upon Plaintiffs' waiver by not asserting points
and authorities to support the vacation ordinance.
In relying on Plaintiffs' relinquishment and abandonment of the vacation
ordinance claims, Defendants lost opportunities to convince the trial court that the
vacation ordinance not only complied with the Utah law, but also did not unduly restrict
Plaintiffs' access to their properties.
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This Court should view with even more dissatisfaction Plaintiffs' attempt to attack
the vacation ordinance on appeal. Plaintiffs openly abandoned its vacation ordinance
claims at the January 30, 1995 hearing. Defendants relied upon that abandonment by
withholding their strong defenses of the vacation ordinance. Now, Plaintiffs, through
duplicity, seek to bypass a trial court's review of their claims and argue the merits of
those claims to this Court. Plaintiffs' strategy reflects a vexatious inclination to maintain
their claims at all costs, no matter how groundless their claims happen to be. Not only
should this Court affirm the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' vacation ordinance claims
because Plaintiffs invited and acquiesced to such dismissal, but this Court should also
find that this appeal is frivolous and interposed solely to harass, cause needless
increase in the cost of litigation, and delay the inevitable and irrevocable dismissal of
Plaintiffs' vacation ordinance claims.
D.

THIS COURT MUST AFFIRM AS TO THE INDIVIDUAL COMMISSIONERS
BECAUSE THEY ARE ABSOLUTELY IMMUNE FROM CLAIMS ARISING OUT
OF THEIR LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS;
Article VI, Section 8 of the Utah Constitution provides in part that "any speech or

debate in either house . . . shall not be questioned in any other place.'' In interpreting
nearly identical language in the United States Constitution,3 the United States Supreme
Court has held that because the privilege of legislators to be free from arrest or civil
process for what they do or say in legislative proceedings has taproots in the
parliamentary struggles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and because
freedom of speech and action in the legislature were "taken as a matter of course by
those who severed the colonies from the crown and founded our nation," that the acts
of state legislators are absolutely privileged notwithstanding an unworthy purpose.
Tennev v. Brandehove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-73, 377 (1951). In Lake Country Estates v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979), the United States Supreme

3

Article I, § 6 of the United States Constitution provides that "any Speech or Debate in either House
. . . shall not be questioned in any other Place."
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Court extended this immunity to regional legislators who were held to be absolutely
immune from actions arising out of legitimate legislative activity. idL at 405-06. The
Court held the reasoning of Tennev applicable to federai, state, and regional legislators
as a matter of federal constitutional law. jd. at 405; see Tenney, 341 U.S. at 373.
The same absolute immunity has been extended by the United States Circuit
Courts of Appeal to include county legislators. Since the Supreme Court's decision in
Lake Country, each of the eleven federal circuits that have considered the question
found its reasoning equally applicable to local legislators, such as county
commissioners, and has granted them absolute immunity from suit. Fry v. Board of
County Comm'rs of the County of Baca. 7 F.3d 936, 942 (10th Cir. 1993); AcevedoCotdero v. Corclero-Santiago, 958 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing Haskali v.
Washington Township, 864 F.2d 1266, 1277 {6th Cir. 1988); Atchison v. RaffiariL708.
F;2d 96. 98-100 (3rd Cir. 1983); Reed v. Shcrewood. 704 F.2d 943? 952-53 (7th Cir.
1983); Espanola Way Corp. v. Meversbn. 690 F.2d 327, 829 (11 th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1039 (1983); Kuzinich v: County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 134950 (9th Cir. 1982); Hernandez v. Lafayette. 643 F.2d 1138, 1193-94 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert, denied. 455 U.S. 907 (1982); Bruce v. Riddle. 631 F 2d 272, 274-80 (4th Cir.
1980); Gorman Towers. Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 611-14 (8th Cir. 1980));
Goldberg v. Town of Rocky Hill 973 F.2d 70, 72-73 (2nd Cir. 1992). Under the doctrine
espoused by these courts, county legislators are immune from actions arising out of the
legislative process at work."' Fry, 7 F.3d at 942.
Under Utah's Speech and Debate Clause, this Court should adopt the absolute
legislative immunity doctrine set forth by the United States Supreme Court and applied
to county legislators by the eleven federal circuits. First, the Utah constitutional
provision and the federal constitutional provision are near duplicates, indicating that the
drafters of the Utah provision intended that it have the same impact as the federal one.
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See State v.Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Utah 1996): State v. Watts, 750 P.2d
1219, 1221 (Utah 1988); KUTV, Inc. v. Conder. 668 P.2d 513, 521 (Utah 1983);
Untermever v. State Tax Comm'n, 102 Utah 214, 129 P.2d 881, 885 (1942).
Moreover, the reasoning adopted by the federal courts is equally applicable in
Utah:
"Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited
discharge of their legislative duty, not for their private
indulgence but for the public good. One must not expect
uncommon courage even in legislators. The privilege would
be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and
inconvenience and distractions of a thai upon a conclusion
of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them
based upon a jury's speculation as to motives. . . .
"Legislative committees have been charged with losing sight
of their duty of disinterestedness, in times of political
passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are readily
attributed to legislative conduct and as readily believed.
Courts are not the place for such controversies. Selfdiscipline and the voters must be the ultimate reiiance for
discouraging or correcting such abuses. The courts should
not go beyond the narrow confines of determining that a
committee's inquiry may fairly be deemed within Its
province."
Fry, 7 F.3d at 942 (quoting Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377-78).
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has reiterated these same ideals. In
Zions First Natl Bank v. Taylor, 15 Utah 2d 239, 390 P.2d 854 (1964), the court stated
that the deposition of the Utah State Bank Commissioner should not have been taken
because it is inappropriate for courts to "'probe the mental processes' of such an
official.'" Id at 856 (quoting Morgan v. United States, 313 U.S 409 (1941)), see also
Sears v. Ogden Citv. 572 P.2d 1359, 1362 (Utah 1977) ("The courts may not delve into
the wisdom of a legislative act. . . ."). In addition, in a case with some resemblance to
the present one, the Utah Supreme Court held that apart from arbitrary or abusive action
"the propriety or necessity of vacating a street, are matters within the discretion of the
municipal authorities which will not be inquired into by the courts" because "faithfulness

22

to the public trust reposed in the members of the legislative body will be presumed."
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identical constitutional provision, the reasoning of the doctrine applies with equal force in
and because the Utah Supreme Court has expressed the same sentiments that
rlie the doctrine, this Court should adof-
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under Article VI, Section 8 of the Utah Constitution as adopted and applied by the
federal
This case is clearly one in which the absolute legislative ii i in i i i i nt) :1 : cti ii « :
should apply. The only claims at issue are ones relating to an ordinance Therefore, tlie
'• ^olutely immune from Plaintiffs' vacation
ordinance claims under the Utah Cor istitution.
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CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs failed to timely file a notice of appeal, arnil therefore this Court lacks
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dismissal of Plaintiffs' damage claims because the trial court prohibited Plaintiffs from
filing such claims in an earlier ruling that has gone unchallenged by Plaintiffs. The
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through their counsel, either openly and affirmatively relinquished those claims or
improperly led the trial court to believe that they did. Finally, the trial court's ruling as to
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absolutely immune from such claims since they arise out of clear legislative functions.
The trial court's summary judgment should be affirmed.
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1

lawsuit as to damages?

2

MR. M. OLSEN:

Well, like I said, your Honor, as

3

I see it, it is all part of the same lawsuit. Originally,

4

we thought it was going to be injunctive relief, however,

5

I'm telling you now that, yes, we did file a complaint on

6

or about December 12.

7
8

THE COURT: So it hasn't spent —

the 90 days has

not expired?

9

MR. M. OLSEN:

I guess not —

10

THE COURT: All right.

11

MR. M. OLSEN:

12

THE COURT:

13

I'm going to allow you to amend if you so choose,

—

as to that.

I understand.

Thank you.

14

and it will be subject to all motions to dismiss and

15

everything else that Mr. Colessides wishes to file. But

16

it will only be as to the injunctive relief —

17

injunctive — I guess it is injunctive relief you're asking

18

me on one hand part of that where a suit to force the

19

county to do something, i.e. enforce their own ordinances,

20

right?

I guess not

21

MR. M. OLSEN: Right.

22

THE COURT: But I am also making the distinction

23

between that and asking for damages.

I think the damages

24

issues are well taken by Mr. Colessides. You will not be

25

able to amend until that 90 days expires pending whatever
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1

the county wishes

2

MR. M

OLSEN;

No problem.

3

THE COU RT: ft t tin at time you very well may be

4

back I n front of me baser :I upon a mo tion to .amend tidied

5

upon that 90 daj s

.6
7

subject t. ::> a ny motions Mr

Colessides, i n terms of

dismissal, lack: of jurisdiction or any other matters.

8
9

B ut any amendment you make will be

MR. COLESSIDES:

Your Hono. i :# clarification for

just on e moment.

10

THE COURT

11

MR. COLESSIDES:
t:h I s i s sort

2 es .
Your Honor, as we have viewed

12

these

- we are deal ing wi th a moving

13

target.

14

going to be filing another version,, of it and wherein, as 1

15

understand :I t.(l they do not seek to invalidate the

16

ordinance, am I correct?

As I sc= € • the second amended complaint they are

17

THE COURT:

That's what, was represented.

18

MR. COLESSIDES:

19

THE

And that „ i ssue i s dead.
-ve tol i them they would

20

amend to not mcjude damages and so only as to the

21

Injunctive relief «:is to have the con inty enforce •• . own

22

ordinance!

23

MR.

'k i I I I " t l i, = ] i lit 1 ta„ ti on
OLSEN:

• ,

And, your Honor, .

It will help

24

counsel, and help yon, it would be that v-*

is* !**-

25

a

u

l In i

< i. 'Ut i , in I

-
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IN

lOUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3
4
5

ALAYNA J. CULBERTSON,
J. BLAINE JOHNSON, EVA C.
JOHNSON, AND DIANE PEARL
MEIBOS,

6

Plaintiffs,
7

VS.

CASE NO. 940903951 AA

8
9
10
11

THE BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS OF SALT LAK;
COUNTY AND COMMISSIONER
E. JAMES BRADLEY, COMMIf--.'
RANDY HORIUCHI and
COMMISSIONER BRENT
individually,

12

Def<
13
14
15

* * * * *

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
(Defendant's motion for summary judgment)

16
17
18

BEFORE THE HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI

19
20

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

21
22

MARCH 29, 1995

23
24
25
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1

capricious.

2

It is to be noted that the court must assume —

3

presume that the land use decision regulations are valid

4

and that it can only determine whether or not the

5

decisions is arbitrary, capricious and illegal. And I say

6

to the court in fact, they did not do that.

7

not do that because they have not presented any evidence

8

before this court on my motion to dismiss, your Honor.

9

They could

Now, as to the other problems, your Honor, they

10

have failed —

obviously they have failed to have their

11

burden of proof show they're properly — and I think that

12

as to the remaining issues, our brief as to the

13

governmental immunity, the Noble case — Debry v. Noble

14

case, which I think it is a seminal case in this

15

particular matter in terms of immunity — all those things

16

adequately covers, your Honor, the rest of our motion.

17

Thank you.

18

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Colessides.

19

Mr. Olsen?

20

MR. OLSEN:

21

May it please the court, counsel:

Thank you, your Honor.
I think we

22

need to back up and I will sort of try and take this, your

23

Honor, as Mr. Colessides has addressed each of these.

24
25

Your Honor, when we were here on January 30th
and —

I know the court is going to rule as it's going to
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I 111in1 -

1

i: til e„

2

transcript

1 Hunk iL yuu

< ,

3

transcript

- by the t h i n g s

* < ,-

4

acknowl i?rlypii I llvit

5

amended c o m p l a i n t .

6

t o l d me y e s , subject

7

••

8

jurisdiction, and any other matters - w e acknowledged

9

that perhaps some of our claims were not ripe at that

|. Mi

vyiti it

MI

1 Winn Id

~.

Xou t o l d me.
to Mr

I "f) 11 P S S i rif-,

12

his

*amages

n I

e

^i

you

i in I H I iiiir

11 I i] I sin i s s a Il

Jl ac : !«< > f

g noti ce to the
county

' lamages

... «,» '-•aci perceived we had incurred.

Furthermore, your Honor, once I take a look at

13

1:1 i„e en I:: 1 re t n an scri j: I: i i I • ::::<:::)i itext

14

plaintiffs' 1 intention to waive any right that they may

15

have to challenge this ordinance.

16

J i t:t: ] e 1: i I: cii n I gi € • tl le r : n i ] : t some i n formation

17

HM

Colessides — subject t o any

10
11

> .
*

ipi

IHUMI I

entire

i t: w a s i i =i .i e r

ev

Let me just explain, a

At that hearing I think we did acknowledge that

18

w e were i n some trouble,, that buildings had been built.

19

There w a s Jil i t: I::.] e w e • • :::: ::: in Il I i:i :::: • t: ::: g =s lit: N :::: r tl l 3E: ' or t: Un 1 oi l b

20

because we could not challenge that ordinance..

21

if you wi ] 1 see in that ordinance, the portion that fronts

22

m} c] i ents ' proper t:;y ,. j £ ] ? r oi :i review the ordinances , that

23

store is - - right now is 33 fee t: w :i I

24

feet of tha t, also vacated that

25

pursuant to Mason v. state and the Provo City case, we are

However,

'They took eight

So as a matter of law,
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1

no showing to my satisfaction in anything addition to what

2

I previously ruled on.

3

as to 17-27-1001, in addition to the county ordinance, has

4

not been complied with.

5

I further find that the provisions

What I'm going to do, I'm going to dismiss this

6

matter without prejudice — without prejudice, that is

7

emphasized —

8

wish to, your administrative remedies, and then have

9

leave, if after that time there has been no resolution to

allowing you to exhaust whatever means you

10

your satisfaction, through the —

11

through the board of planning —

12

through the Board of County Commissioners and the Board of

13

Adjustment, then you do have leave, without prejudice, to

14

refile the matter.

15

I also take —

through Mr. Jones,
the Planning Commission,

and I would ask that you receive a

16

copy of the transcript in this matter, Mr. Olsen, for

17

those positions taken by Mr. Colessides, in that you are

18

not going to be prejudiced by any waiver of time.

19

It is my indication from listening to you,

20

Mr. Colessides, that you're maintaining that it is a

21

continuing problem and that there will be no waiver of

22

time, and your position taken before me today, and I

23

expect that no contrary position be taken in further

24

litigation —

25

MR. COLESSIDES: That's correct with the
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1

exception of the vacation ordinance.

2
3

THE COURT: And the vacation ordinance is subject
to a previous order that I made.

4

MR. COLESSIDES:

Right. As it relates, your

5

Honor, to enforcement of 1186 and to the conditional use

6

permit, I respectfully submit to the court that so long as

7

there is a continuous development, that is a continuous

8

enforcement problem, and therefore, there is not —

9

that sense there is no time limitations.

10

in

THE COURT: The reason why I state that,

11

Mr. Olsen, the court is relying somewhat upon

12

Mr. Colessides's position in that matter in rendering the

13

decision, which in my opinion would minimize whatever

14

prejudice, if any, would be to the plaintiffs in this

15

matter.

16

All I'm asking you to start again, go through the

17

procedures.

18

you are now, you will have leave to refile.

19

not —

20

the computer will spit out.

21

as to the —

22

based upon the responses and the allegations, and it will

23

be dismissed without prejudice to follow those procedures

24

as I have indicated.

25

If at that time you're at the same posture as

it may or may not come to me.

It will

I don't know what

But that would be my ruling

this would be the judgment on the pleadings

Mr. Colessides, could you draft up the
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v&ED DISTRICT COURT

APR 1 4 1995
NICK J COLESSIDES (# 696)
Attorney at Law
466 South 400 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325
Tele: (801) 521-4441

DepuyCfeiK

Attorney for defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALAYNA J. CULBERTSON,
J. BLAINE JOHNSON,
EVA C. JOHNSON, and
DIANE PEARL MEIBOS,

ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS OF SALT
LAKE COUNTY, and
COMMISSIONER E. JAMES
BRADLEY, COMMISSIONER
RANDY HORIUCHI and
COMMISSIONER BRENT
OVERSON, individually,

Case No.: 94 09 03951
Judge:

Glenn K. Iwasaki

Defendants.
Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings or
in the alternative motion for summary judgment having come
regularly for hearing, pursuant to notice, on the 29th day of
March, 1995, before the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki, Judge,
presiding, plaintiffs being represented by Martin N. Olsen,
their attorney of record, and defendants being represented by

G$$€4'?

Nick J, Colessides, their attorney of record, and the Court
having

reviewed

the

various

motions,

memoranda,

and

accompanying affidavits submitted in behalf of all parties,
and the Court having heard argument by both counsel on behalf
of all parties, and the matter having been submitted to the
Court for a decision, and good cause otherwise appearing
therefor, now upon motion of Nick J. Colessides attorney for
defendants,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED, AND ADJUDGED that
plaintiffs7 claims as contained within plaintiffs' second
amended complaint, relating to that certain Salt Lake County
Ordinance

as passed

by

the Board

of

Salt

Commissioners, to-wit, ordinance number 1275

Lake

County

(corrected),

dated August 10, 1995, and recorded August 12, 1995, in the
records of the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office, be and the
same are hereby dismissed with prejudice; and
FURTHER, ORDERED that plaintiffs' all other claims
as asserted against defendants in plaintiffs' second amended
complaint, be dismissed without prejudice; and
FURTHER, ORDERED that plaintiffs' second amended
complaint

p rej udi=e.

be

and

the

same

is hereby

fc

dismissed

without

,

Dated this / 7 day of //v/U

C

t

1995.

2
A

fi a a A <z

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND SUBSTANCE:

MARTIN N. OLSEN
Attorney for plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Served a copy of the foregoing to:
MR MARTIN OLSEN ESQ
ATTORNEY AT LAW
OLSEN & OLSEN
8138 SOUTH STATE STREET
MIDVALE UTAH 84047
MR KENT LEWIS ESQ
ATTORNEY AT LAW
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
2001 SOUTH STATE STREET # S 3600
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84190-1200
by mailing the same, first class mail,postage prepaid, this
/3rr day of April, 1995.
^N

h\ha\cutberts.155
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'

-liXERK

toKJ6l&fa
DIANE PEAKKMEBOS
Plaintiff—prose
3278 Marjon Circle
Sandy, UT 84092-4212
Telephone: 942-3036

1
o

£v

^ lOvvi'l^

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

o

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

D

rALAYNA J. CULBERTSON, J. BLAINE
JOHNSON, EVA C. JOHNSON, and
DIANE PEARL MEIBOS

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs,
vs.

THE BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
and COMMISSIONER E. JAMES BRADLEY,
COMMISSIONER RANDY HORIUCHI, and
COMMISSIONER BRENT OVERSON,
individually,

Civil No. 940903951
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)

ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Notice is hereby given that Plaintiffs/Appellants above-named hereby
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court the order of the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki entered
in this matter on April 14, 1995. The appeal if takenfromsuch part of the order stating
that:
"... plaintiffs' claims as contained within plaintiffs' second amended

000706

complaint, relating to that certain Salt Lake Coimty Ordinance as passed by
the Board of Salt Lake County Commissioners, to-wit, ordinance number
1275 (corrected), dated August 10, 1995, and recorded August 12, 1995, in
the records of the Salt Lake County Recorder's office, be and the same are
hereby dismissed with prejudice..."

DATED this

Zl7~ day of September, 1995.

Alayna ^/tul^tson — Plaintiff

/&>yw-

*£ - ^pJl^yut^y^-

Eva C. Johnson — Plaintiff

Ui^y*+-

J. Blaine Johnson — Plaintiff

2
fl f\ i\ *7 f\ 7

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 27th of September, 1995, I mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to:
Nick J. Colessides, Esq.
466 South 400 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3325
Kent Lewis, Esq.
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office
2001 South State Street, No. S-3600
Salt Lake City, UT 84190-1200

l^flUV)
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NOTICE OF CLAIM
COME NOW, ALAYNA J. CULBERTSON, J. BLAINE JOHNSON, EVA
C. JOHNSON

and DIANE PEARL MEIBOS, by and

attorney Martin N. Olsen and pursuant
Section 63-30-11

through

their

to Utah Code Ann.

(1993) hereby provide notice for claim of

injury to Salt Lake County, which injury resulted from Salt
Lake County's failure to enforce ordinance No. 1275 entered
August 10, 1994.
I.

BRIEF STATEMENT OF FACTS.
On AugXist 10, 1994, Salt Lake County, through its Board

of

Commissioners,

to wit: Commissioner E. James

Bradley,

Commissioner Randy Horiuchi, and Commissioner Brent Overson
passed Ordinance No. 1275 which provided in part:
3. That the segment of North Union
Avenue described in paragraph 2 is being closed
rather than vacated in order that Salt Lake
County may convey an access easement over said
property
to Hermes Associates Ltd., the
adjacent property owner to the north, and to
the owners of lots 3, 4, 5, 6, 19, 20, 21, and
22, Fort Union Plat, the adjacent property
owners on the south ("south property owners"),
-which will allow better access to their
respective properties than by having the
property revert as a matter of law, half to
each by vacation; that the south property
owners will still have direct access to 7250
South and will be provided additional access to
the north side of the properties from 7240
South through a 25 foot wide public right-ofway which will be conveyed by Hermes Associates
Ltd. to Salt Lake County. The 25 foot public

EttllglT JL
A A A

/? A

fk

rightrof-way will revert to Hermes Associates,
Inc. in the event it acquires the south
properties.
Salt Lake County has failed to enforce the above
provision; specifically, despite several notices, Salt Lake
County has allowed the developer, Fort Union Associates, to
build into the twenty-five foot public right of way.

Thus,

the above named parties have been denied reasonable access and
county services.
II. NATURE OF CLAIM ASSERTED.
As

a result

of the County's

failure

to enforce

Ordinance No. 127 5 enacted August 10, 1994, the above named
parties have sustained

injury as they have been denied

reasonable access to their property and have also been denied
county services.
III. DAMAGES INCURRED.
Inasmuch as damages cannot be ascertained at this time,
notice of the same will be provided at such time that such
^—•%.

becomes available.

s ^

MARTIN' N.IOLSEN

'

Attorney ^or Claimants

2

0 0049 4

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the J^+K. day of December, 1994, I
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF CLAIM,
postage prepaid thereon, to:
Kent
Salt
2001
Salt

Lewis, Esq.
Lake County Attorney's Office
South State Street, S-3600
Lake City, Utah 84190-1200

Nick J. Colessides, Esq.
Attorney at Law
466 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3303

v / C
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R. Owen NEERINGS, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
UTAH STATE BAR and Sydnie Kuhre,
Defendants and Appellees.
Nos. 890088, 890239, 890425 and 890509.

Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a, b); Sup.Ct
Rules, Rule 4(b) (Repealed).
Brian M. Barnard, John Pace, Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff and appellant.
Carman E. Kipp, Robert H. Rees, Salt
Lake City, for defendants and appellees.

HALL, Chief Justice:
Plaintiff R. Owen Neerings sought to
Aug. 2, 1991.
recover damages caused by the unauthorized publication of private information.
Neerings appeals from the entry of sumBar examinee brought action against mary judgment in favor of defendants the
state bar and its employee for revealing Utah State Bar and Sydnie Kuhre ("the
failing score to examinee's co-worker be- Bar'*). We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
fore officially informing him. The District
When reviewing an order granting sumCourt, Salt Lake County, James S. Sawaya,
J., granted summary judgment for bar and mary judgment, the facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the
employee. Examinee appealed. The Sufacts are to be viewed in a light most
preme Court, Hall, C.J., held that trial
favorable to the party opposing the mocourt's failure to issue written statement of
tion.1
grounds for granting summary judgment
Neerings, as part of his application for
was not violation of rules requiring court
membership
in the Bar, sat for the Februto state grounds for decision and to make
amendments to findings, and therefore rule ary 1988 written examination. It is necesallowing tolling of time to appeal when sary to successfully complete the bar exmotion to amend findings is filed was not amination in order to be admitted to the
Bar, a prerequisite to engage in the pracapplicable, and appeal was dismissed.
tice of law in the state of Utah. Prior to
Appeal dismissed.
the time the official results of the examinaHowe, Associate C.J., filed dissenting tion were released, Kuhre, an employee of
the Bar, informed Fasselin, a co-worker of
opinion.
Neerings, that Neerings had failed the examination. Fasselin then informed other
Appeal and Error <£=»344
co-workers of the results of the examinaJudgment <s=>186
tion. Neerings was officially informed that
By stating that it agreed with argu- he did not pass the examination on March
ment and citation of authorities stated in 25, 1988.
each of defendant's points in its summary
Neerings appealed the result of his bar
judgment motion, trial court substantially examination to the Utah State Bar Commiscomplied with rule requiring trial court to sion. Again, prior to the time Neerings
state grounds for its decision on summary was officially informed of the disposition of
judgment when motion is based on more his appeal, Kuhre informed Fasselin that
than one ground; therefore, plaintiffs mo- Neerings' appeal was unsuccessful Neertion for additional findings was not a mo- ings was officially informed that his appeal
tion under rule providing that upon motion was unsuccessful on May 27, 1988. Alof party made not later than 10 days after though the Bar has enacted no rules conentry of judgment court may amend its cerning the confidentiality of examination
findings or make additional findings, and results, there is a "long-standing practice
filing of motion did not toll time for appeal. and unwritten but strictly-enforced policy"
Supreme Court of Utah.

1. Culp Constr. Co. v. Buildmart Mall 795 P.2d

650, 651 (Utah 1990).

NEERINGS v. UTAH STATE BAR
Cite as 817 ?2d 320 (Utah 1991)

that the names of those applicants who do
not pass the examination should not be
released. However, the names of applicants who pass the examination are published.
On June 9, 1988, Neerings initiated this
action, claiming that by publicizing the results of his bar examination, the Bar (1)
violated the Utah Archives and Records
Service and Information Practice Act, Utah
Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 to -89, (2) violated
Neerings' constitutional right to privacy,
(3) negligently breached a duty of confidentiality established by the Bar's internal policies, and (4) tortiously invaded Neerings'
common law right to privacy. The Bar
moved for summary judgment pursuant to
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and on
January 12, 1989, the district court, by an
initialed minute entry, entered summary
judgment dismissing all of Neerings'
claims.
After this minute entry, a number of
motions, minute entries, orders, and notices
of appeal followed. On January 20, 1989,
Neerings filed a motion entitled "Motion/Request for Findings," requesting
that since defendants' motion was based on
more than one ground, the court issue a
brief written statement of the grounds for
its decision. In this motion, Neerings cited
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)2 and
quoted language from it. However, in the
motion, a request was made for the entry
of "findings of fact," which, Neerings now
argues, is a request appropriately made
under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b).3
On February 1, 1989, Neerings filed a motion entitled "Motion For New Trial and To
Amend Judgment" pursuant to Utah Rule
2. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides in
pertinent part:
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the
facts without a jury or with an advisory jury,
the court shall find the facts specifically and
state separately its conclusions of law thereon
Findings of fact, whether based on
oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous
The trial
court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in ruling on motions, except as provided for in Rule 41(b). The court
shall, however, issue a brief written statement
of the grounds for its decision on all motions
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56,
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of Civil Procedure 59 wherein he again
requested that the court issue a brief written statement of the grounds for its decision. On February 6, 1989, the court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of the Bar without acting on
Neerings' rule 52(a) and rule 59 motions.
On February 15, 1989, the trial judge entered an initialed minute entry denying
Neerings' rule 52(a) motion, stating that
"specific findings of fact are not required
under the rules for the entry of summary
judgment." The trial judge also stated
that he agreed with the argument and citation of authorities stated in each of the
Bar's points in its motion for summary
judgment. On February 23, 1989, the
court entered an initialed minute entry denying Neerings' rule 59 motion.
On March 9, 1989, thirty-one days after
the February order granting the Bar's motion for summary judgment, Neerings filed
a notice of appeal. On March 15, 1989, the
trial court entered an order denying Neerings' motion for a new trial or to amend the
judgment. On May 15, 1989, the Bar filed
a motion to dismiss the appeal, in the supreme court, on the ground that the notice
of appeal was granted prior to the time the
trial court acted on Neerings' rule 59 motion. Neerings then sent a letter to the
trial judge stating that there was only a
minute entry denying the January 20 motion entitled "Motion/Request for Findings." Neerings prepared an order which
characterized the January 20 motion as a
motion to enter findings under rule 52(b)
and enclosed it in the letter. This order
was signed and entered on May 24, 1989.
On June 6, 1989, Neerings filed a second
and 59 when the motion is based on more
than one ground.
Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a) (emphasis added).
3. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b) provides in
pertinent part:
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of party
made not later than the 10 days after the
entry of judgment the court may amend its
findings or make additional findings and may
amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for new trial
pursuant to Rule 59.
Utah R.Civ.P. 52(b) (emphasis added).
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notice of appeal from the February 6, 19899
order granting summary judgment. Neer-ings claimed that the time for appeal was3
extended pursuant to rule 4(b) of the Rules3
of the Utah Supreme Court4 by his Janu-ary 20, 1989 motion, which Neerings char-acterized as a rule 52(b) motion. The Barr
filed a second motion in the supreme court,,
claiming that the second appeal was nott
timely. The Bar argued that Neerings''
January 20, 1989 motion was not a rule>
52(b) motion but a rule 52(a) motion, whichI
does not extend the time for filing a notice>
of appeal. Neerings responded by movingj
to consolidate the two appeals. On Augustt
7, 1989, this court entered a minute entryr
consolidating the cases and denying defendants' motion to dismiss, but reserving thej
Bar's motion for plenary presentation and'
consideration.
On August 25, 1989, the trial court entered an order vacating its May 24 order,,
denying Neerings' January 20 "Motion/Request for Findings," and characterizing the\
January 20 motion as a rule 52(b) motion.
On September 27, 1989, Neerings filed aL
third notice of appeal. On November 1,
1989, the trial court entered an order vacating its August 25, 1989 order, denying
Neerings' January 20 "Motion/Request for
Findings," and characterizing the January
20 motion as a rule 52(a) motion. On November 16, Neerings filed his fourth notice
of appeal. On January 23, 1991, the latter
two appeals were consolidated with the
first two appeals and the issue of whether
Neerings had timely filed a notice of appeal
was again reserved for plenary presentation.
A number of substantive issues are
presented in this appeal, including whether
4. Rule of the Utah Supreme Court 4(b) provides
in pertinent part:
(b) Motions post judgment or orders. If a
timely motion under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is filed in the trial court by a party
... (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make
additional findings of fact, whether or not an
alteration of the judgment would be required
if the motion is granted ... or (4) under Rule
59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all
parties shall run from the entry of the order
denying a new trial or granting or denying
any other such motion
A notice of ap-

the Bar is a state agency within the contemplation of the Archives and Records
Services and Information Practices Act,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 to -89 (1989),
and the Public and Private Writings Act,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-26-1 to -8 (1987).
However, this issue has heretofore been
resolved by our decision in Barnard v.
Utah State Bar} In any event, the dispositive issue presented is whether Neerings
filed a timely notice of appeal. In their
briefs, both parties maintain that dispositive of the issue of the timely filing of the
notice of appeal is whether the January 20,
1989 motion was a rule 52(b) motion, which
tolls the time for appeal, or a rule 52(a)
motion, which does not toll the time for
appeal.
While rule 52(a) requires the trial court
to state the grounds for its decision on
summary judgment where the motion
therefor is based on more than one ground,
no mechanism is contained therein to enforce compliance. Likewise, rule 52(b) contains no such enforcement provision, its
only purpose being to permit the filing of
motions for amendment or the making of
additional findings of fact, which, pursuant
to rule 52(a), are not required in ruling
upon motions for summary judgment We
therefore conclude that whether Neerings'
motion was couched in terms of rule 52(a)
or 52(b) makes no significant difference in
the resolution of the issue presented.
Neerings cites and relies upon Alford v.
Utah League of Cities and Toums* as
authority for the proposition that rule 52(b)
affords a mechanism to challenge the failure of the trial court to state the grounds
for granting summary judgment However, the Alford court declined to address
peal must be filed within the prescribed time
measured from the entry of the order of the
district court disposing of the motion as provided above.
5. 804 P.2d 526 (Utah 1991). There we concluded that the Bar is not a state agency within the
meaning of the applicable acts. Id. at 529-30.
This ruling apparently prompted plaintiff to
forego the presentation of oral argument on this
appeal.
6. 791 P.2d 201, 204 (Utah Ct.App.1990).
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the issue on its merits for the reason that it
had not been raised at trial and was
presented for the first time on appeal.7
Inasmuch as summary judgment is only
appropriate when there is no genuine issue
of material fact, and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law,8
the inclusion of the requirement in rule
52(a) that the court shall issue a statement
of the ground for its decision cannot bear
upon the undisputed factual basis for the
decision. Hence, it can only bear upon
alternative theories of law that may apply
to the facts.
While it may be instructive for the trial
court to inform the litigants of the legal
basis for its decision, we are not persuaded
that failure to do so constitutes reversible
error. In any event, in the instant case, it
appears that the trial court substantially
complied with rule 52(a) by stating that it
agreed with the argument and citation of
authorities stated in each of the Bar's
points in its motion for summary judgment.
A more important reason for inclusion of
the requirement that the trial court state
the ground for its decision^ in summary
judgment cases is administrative in nature
in that it would provide a ready basis for
review on appeal. However, also from the
administrative point of view, failure to
state the grounds for its decision would not
constitute reversible error. Rather, in an
appropriate case, failure to do so may only
justify remand to the trial court
We therefore conclude that the notice of
appeal was not timely filed. We are hence
without jurisdiction, and the appeal is dismissed.
STEWART, DURHAM and
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice
(dissenting):
I dissent. I would not dismiss the appeal. Neerings' motion filed on January 20
was entitled "Motion/Request for Findings/' In the body, plaintiff moved the
court "to enter Findings of Fact" in the
7.

See Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd of Educ, 797
P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990).

above matter. Despite whatever else may
have been in the motion, I am satisfied that
it requested relief under rule 52(b) and the
time for appeal was tolled until the trial
court ruled on the motion.
(o
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AJ. MACKAY COMPANY, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
••

OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC., Defendant and Appellee.
No. 890172.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 16, 1991.
Subcontractor brought action against
general contractor to enforce arbitration
clause, and contractor counterclaimed for
damages. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, James S. Sawaya, J., granted
summary judgment to general contractor
on arbitration issue, and appeal was taken.
The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held
that order was not final, appealable order.
Appeal dismissed.
1. Arbitration <s=>23.20
Order finding that subcontractor was
barred from enforcing arbitration rights
under contract due to lack of valid contractor's license at time work was performed
was notfinal,appealable order in that general contractor's counterclaim against subcontractor remained pending. Rules App.
Proc, Rule 3.
2. Courts e=*23, 37(2), 39
Acquiescence of parties is insufficient
to confer jurisdiction on court; lack of jur8. Utah RXiv.P. 56(c).
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Dale EL MORGAN, Plaintiff
and Appellee,
Barbara A. MORGAN, Defendant
and Appellant
No- 920846-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 11, 1994.
Quiet title action was commenced for
vacation property which former husband purchased from foreclosing entity following expiration of former wife's redemption period
and former wife asserted counterclaim.
Husband's motion for summary judgment
was granted by the Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Richard H. Moffat, J. Former
wife appealed. The Court of Appeals, Bench,
J., held that: (1) no cotenancy or fiduciary
duty arose from husband's purchase of vacation property; (2) former wife, as judgment
debtor, lacked interest in property to challenge sale to former husband; ,(£) validity of
foreclosure proceeding could not be collaterally attacked; and (4) former wife was not
entitled to lien on vacation property for child
support arrearages and other unpaid obligations.
Affirmed.
1. Judgment <5>181(2)
Summary judgment may be granted
only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and moving party is entitled to
judgment as matter of law. Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 56(c).
2. Appeal and Error ®=>842(1)
On appeal from summary judgment, appellate court resolves only legal issues and,
thus, does not defer to trial court's ruling.
Rules CivJProc, Rule 56(c).
3. Fraud <3>7
No fiduciary relationship existed between former husband and wife which imposed fiduciary duty upon husband to preserve wife's interest in' foreclosed vacation

property, even though parties were awarded
undivided one-half interest in property in
divorce decree, given that husband had subsequently quit-claimed his interest in properties to former wife and parties had been
divorced approximately seven years before
husband purchased property from foreclosing
entity.
4. Tenancy in Common @=>3
Former husband's purchase of vacation
property from homeowners' association following foreclosure did not revive cotenancy
relationship that existed during marriage
and, thus, former husband owed no fiduciary
duty to preserve former wife's interest in
property.
5. Execution <s=>244
Former wife, as judgment debtor and
former owner, lacked interest needed to challenge validity of sale of property following
foreclosure and expiration of redemption period to debtor's former husband.
6. Execution <s=>246
Judgment debtor could not collaterally
* attack foreclosure proceeding by objecting to
quiet title suit brought by debtor's former
•husband who purchased property from foreclosing entity.
7. Process <s=»146
Allegation that defendant could not remember being served with process is irrelevant, provided that service of process was
valid.
8- Divorce e=*311.5
Former wife was not entitled to lien for
child support arrearages and other unpaid
expenses against vacation property which
husband purchased from foreclosing entity
after wife's redemption period had expired,
given that arrearages and foreclosures occurred after former husband had transferred
interest in properties to former wife and
while former wife was sole owner of properties.
Gordon A. Madsen and Robert C. Cummings, Salt Lake City, for appellant

564

Utah

875 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

Mary C. Corporon, Salt Lake City, for
appellee.
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and DAVIS,
JJ.
OPINION
BENCH, Judge:
Defendant Barbara Morgan appeals the
trial court's order granting summary judgment to plaintiff Dale Morgan. We affirm.
FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant were divorced in
1979. The divorce decree awarded plaintiff
and defendant each an undivided one-half
interest in the residence in Salt Lake County
(residence) and in a lodge in Summit County
(summer home).
In 1984, plaintiff quit-claimed to defendant
his interest in the residence and summer
home to allegedly facilitate the sale of the
properties. In 1986, plaintiff filed an action
against defendant and others alleging that
defendant had defrauded him into quit-claiming to defendant his interest in the two properties. Plaintiffs action sought to quiet title
in him to an undivided one-half interest in
the residence and summer home.

expired. Plaintiff subsequently purchased
the summer home from the homeowners' association.
In 1988, defendant filed a counterclaim
against plaintiff, alleging that plaintiff collusively allowed the summer home to be foreclosed upon and thereafter "redeemed" the
property after it was sold at a sheriff's sale.
Defendant also sought recovery for arrearages allegedly owed under the divorce decree.
Plaintiffs and defendant's causes of action
were ultimately consolidated into the divorce
action, presumably under the court's continuing jurisdiction.
In 1992, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment in the consolidated action,
seeking to relinquish any claim he may have
had in the residence and to quiet title in the
summer home. The trial court issued a minute entry granting plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, dismissing both parties'
claims and adjudging plaintiff the sole owner
of the summer home. Defendant filed objections to plaintiffs proposed order, to which
plaintiff filed a response. Although the trial
court did not expressly rule on defendant's
objections, it did sign plaintiffs proposed order granting summary judgment for plaintiff.
ISSUES

In a separate action in 1986, Pine Meadow
Ranch Owners' Association (homeowners' association) filed a suit against plaintiff in Summit County, alleging that he owed the homeowners' association over $4,000 for assessments on the summer home. Later that
year, the homeowners' association amended
its complaint, adding Barbara Morgan as a
defendant because she held legal title to the
summer home. She failed to respond to the
amended complaint and default was entered
against her for approximately $7,000. The
homeowners' association obtained a writ of
execution against the summer home. The
county sheriff sold the summer home to the
homeowners' association, subject to a sixmonth redemption period. The deed was
recorded after the redemption period had

Defendant raises the following issues on
appeal: (1) whether plaintiff and defendant
were cotenants in the summer home, thereby
creating a fiduciary duty to deal non-adversely with each other concerning the summer
home; (2) whether the trial court properly
dismissed defendant's claim that plaintiff and
the homeowners' association were in collusion
in conducting the sheriffs sale; (3) whether
the Summit County action was valid as it
relates to the consolidated action; and (4)
whether the alleged arrearages on the residence and summer home relating to mortgage payments, property taxes, insurance,
and repairs to the residence, as well as alleged child support arrearages, were subject
to dismissal on plaintiffs motion for summary judgment.1

1. As a threshold matter, defendant argues that
the summary judgment was not a final otder
because her objections thereto were not express-

Iy ruled upon. Defendant submitted timely objections to plaintiffs proposed order under Rule
4-504(2) of the Code of Judicial Administration,

MORGAN v. iMORGAN
Cite as 875 P.2d 563 (UtahApp. 1994)

STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] A summary judgment may be
granted only where there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Higgins v. Salt Lake
Cvunty, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). On
appeal from a summary judgment, we resolve only legal issues; therefore, we do not
defer to the trial court's rulings. Ferree u
State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). We
may, however, "affirm a grant of summary
judgment on any ground available to the trial
court, even if it is one not relied on below/'
Higgins, 855 F2d at 235 (citing Hill v. Seattle First NaVl Bank 827 P.2d 241, 246
(Utah 1992)).
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Summit County, defendant was the sole owner of both properties. In view of his quitclaim deeds to defendant, plaintiffs subsequent purchase of the summer home from
the homeowners' association did not revive
the cotenancy relationship that existed during the parties' marriage. Since there was
no cotenancy, plaintiff owed nofiduciaryduty
to defendant.

Collusion
[5] Defendant argues that plaintiff and
the homeowners' association colluded in conducting the sheriffs sale of the summer
home.2 Specifically, defendant argues that
the homeowners' association sold the summer
home to plaintiff for a price substantially
lower than its market value. We believe that
defendant's argument is without merit.
ANALYSIS
Once defendant's redemption period had expired,
she was in no position to challenge the
Cotenancy
homeowners' association's sale of the sumDefendant argues that she and plaintiff
mer home to plaintiff since she was a mere
were cotenants to the summer home and that
stranger to the transaction. See, e.g., 33
defendant therefore had 'a fiduciary duty to
C.J.S. Executions § 274 (1942) ("After the
preserve her interest in the summer home. sale and the expiration of the redemption
We disagree.
period, the judgment debtor has no such
[3,4] Plaintiff and defendant were not interest in the land as will entitle [her] to
cotenants of the summer home at the com- raise objections to the completion of the exemencement, or during the pendency, of the cution sale ..., [she] then occupying the
Summit County action. The parties had position of a mere stranger."). Therefore,
been divorced approximately seven years pri- defendant may not complain about the homeor to the Summit County action. See, e.g., owners' association's sale of the summer
Glover v. Glover, 121 Utah 362, 366-67, 242 home to plaintiff.
P.2d 298, 300 (1952) (fiduciary relationship
Validity of Summit County action
may exist between husband and wife before
divorce decree is entered). Although the
[6,7] Defendant argues that the foredivorce decree awarded plaintiff and defen- closure proceeding in Summit County estabdant an undivided one-half interest in the lished no basis to quiet title to the summer
residence and the summer home, plaintiff home in plaintiff. Essentially, defendant atsubsequently quit-claimed to defendant his tempts to collaterally attack the Summit
interest in both properties. The quit-claim County action by arguing that she did not
deeds were later recorded. At the time the remember receiving service of process in
homeowners' association filed its action in that action. This appeal is not, however, the
which provides that such objections be submitted
within five days after service of the proposed
order. After the five-day period had expired, the
trial court signed plaintiff's proposed order without expressly ruling on defendant's objections.
The objections were before the trial court; therefore, we believe the court implicitly denied plaintiffs objections. In any event, the "jime for
filing [a] notice of appeal begins to run when the
judgment is entered
" Workman v. Nagle

Constr, Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 751 n. 4 (Utah App.
1990).
2.

Defendant also argues that she is entided to
complete her discovery in order to determine
whether plaintiff and the homeowners' association were in collusion. In light of defendant's
prolonged failure to respond to the Summit
County action, this argument is without merit.
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proper forum to object to the Summit County
action. See, e.g., Zion's Benefit Bldg. Soc'y
v. Geary, 112 Utah 548, 553, 189 T2d 964,
966 (1948) (default judgment from foreclosure proceeding that was not appealed
could not be collaterally attacked). Defendant may challenge the validity of the Summit County action only in the Summit County
court where all of the parties can be before
the court.3

with respect to the sales price for the summer home is without merit The validity of
the foreclosure proceeding may be attacked
directly in the Summit County court—not
collaterally on appeal in this action. It was
proper for the trial court to dismiss the
claims for arrearages on summary judgment;
however, the summary judgment does not
preclude defendant from attempting to collect arrearages for child support

Arrearages

The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed.

[8] Defendant's counterclaim for $49,590
was based upon alleged arrearages for mortgage payments, property taxes, insurance,
repairs to the residence, and child support
Defendant sought to have plaintiffs alleged
liability for these amounts adjudged as a lien
against any interest the court determined
plaintiff had in the properties.
The arrearages for both properties occurred after plaintiff had quit-claimed his
interest in the properties to defendant, or in
order words, while defendant was the sole
owner. Therefore, under the facts of this
case, plaintiff would not be responsible for
arrearages of properties in which he had no
interest.
Defendant also argued a lien should have
been placed on the summer home against
plaintiff for child support arrearages. Under
the facts of this case, we reject this argument. Nonetheless, we note that the trial
court's granting of plaintiffs motion for summary judgment does not preclude defendant
from bringing an action to collect for alleged
arrearages in child support We merely hold
that the trial court properly granted plaintiff
summary judgment in dismissing such arrearages as a lien on the summer home.
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly granted* summary
judgment for plaintiff. Plaintiff and defendant were not cotenants during the Summit
County action and, thus, owed no fiduciary
duty to each other. Defendant's argument
3.

Even if we could address the validity of the
Summit County action in this appeal, the record
contains a return of service in the Summit County action. The fact that defendant could not
remember being served with process would

BILLINGS and DAVIS, JJ., concur.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Jason W. JENNINGS, Defendant
and Appellant.
No, 930604-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 16, 1994.

Defendant was convicted in the Second
District Court, Weber County, Stanton M.
Taylor, J., of criminal solicitation to commit
murder, and attempted rape of child. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Greenwood, J., held that record did not support defendant's claim that he mistakenly
thought that permission to withdraw guilty
plea was automatically granted provided that
motion was timely.
Affirmed.
make no difference so long as the service of
process was valid. See, e.g., Bowen v. Olson, 122
Utah 66, 74-75, 246 P.2d 602. 605-06 (1952)
(judgment is void and subject to collateral attack
if lack of jurisdiction appears on face of record).
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GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
to his crops caused by seepage of water from
defendant city's canal where no claim was presented therefor to city within a year. Dahl v.
Salt Lake City, 45 Utah 544, 147 P. 622 (1915)
(decided under former law).
Presentation of claim within time fixed by
law is a condition precedent to bringing action
against municipality. Brown v. Salt Lake City,
33 Utah 222, 93 P. 570, 14 L.R.A. (n.s.) 619,
126 Am. St. R. 828, 14 Ann. Cas. 1004 (1908);
Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228
P. 213 (1924) (decided under former law).
Notice.
The fact that employees of the county in fact
knew of the plaintiffs injuries at the time they
occurred does not dispense with the necessity
of filing a timely claim. Edwards v. Iron

63-30-15

County ex rel. Valley View Medical Center,
531 P.2d 476 (Utah 1975).
Notice requirement is applicable to
§ 63-30-9. Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542
P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975) (decided under former
law).
Notice-of-claim provisions applied to former
county employee's sex discrimination claims
arising from acts occurring after the effective
date of the 1987 amendment, notwithstanding
her contention that the conduct complained of
was continuous in nature, stemming from earlier sexual harassment occurring before the effective date of the amendment. Sauers v. Salt
Lake County, 735 F. Supp. 381 (D. Utah 1990).
Cited in Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276
(Utah 1985); Schultz v. Conger, 755 P.2d 165
(Utah 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal
Corporations, Counties, and Other Political
Subdivisions § 680 et seq.
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Counties §§ 239, 240; 64
C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 2173, 2174,
2199; 79 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts
§§ 423, 433.

A.L.R. — See A.L.R. Annotations listed under § 63-30-11.
Key Numbers. — Counties <&=> 200, 203, 213;
Municipal Corporations <&=> 1001, 1005, 1008,
1021; Schools <&=» 112.

63-30-14. Claim for injury — Approval or denial by governmental entity or insurance carrier within
ninety days.
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the governmental entity or its
insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify the claimant in writing of its
approval or denial. A claim shall be deemed to have been denied if at the end
of the ninety-day period the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has
failed to approve or deny the claim.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 14.

63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury — Authority and time
for filing action against governmental entity.
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district
court against the governmental entity or an employee of the entity.
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the
claim or within one year after the denial period specified in this chapter has
expired, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 15; 1983, ch.
129, § 6; 1985, ch. 82, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 7.
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P. 213 (1924) (decided under former law).
Notice.
The fact that employees of the county in fact
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal
Corporations, Counties, and Other Political
Subdivisions § 680 et seq.
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Counties §§ 239, 240; 64
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§§ 423, 433.
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1021; Schools «=» 112.
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ninety days.
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the governmental entity or its
insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify the claimant in writing of its
approval or denial. A claim shall be deemed to have been denied if at the end
of the ninety-day period the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has
failed to approve or deny the claim.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 14.

63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury — Authority and time
for filling action against governmental entity.
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district
court against the governmental entity or an employee of the entity.
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the
claim or within one year after the denial period specified in this chapter has
expired, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 15; 1983, ch.
129, § 6; 1985, ch. 82, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 7.
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Art. VI, § 8

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

now considering, that a term of office fixed by
statute runs not only for the period fixed, but
for an additional period between the date fixed
for its termination and the date at which a suecessor shall be qualified to take the office, the
period between the expiration of the term fixed

by statute and the time at which a successor
shall be qualified to take the office is as much a
part of the incumbent's term as the fixed statutory period." State ex rel. Jugler v. Grover, 102
Utah 41,125 P.2d 807,102 Utah 459,132 PJ2d
125 (1942).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Eligibility of Public
Officers and Employees to Serve in the State
Legislature: An Essay on Separation of
Powers, Politics, and Constitutional Policy,
1988 Utah L. Rev. 295.

Am. Jur. 2d. — 72 Am. Jur. 2d States, Territories, and Dependencies § 44.
C-J.S. — 81A C J.S. States § 42.
Key Numbers. — States ** 28(1).

Sec. 8. [Privilege from arrest]
Members of the Legislature, in all cases except treason, felony or breach of
the peace, shall be privilegedfromarrest during each session of the Legislature, forfifteendays next preceding each session, and in returning therefrom;
and for words used in any speech or debate in either house, they shall not be
questioned in any other place.
History: Const 1896.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Purpose of privilege.
By this section the state took great care to
preserve the principle that the legislature
must be free to speak and act without fear of
criminal and civil liability. Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 71 S. Ct. 783, 95 L.
Ed. 1019 (1951).
The claim of an unworthy purpose does not
destroy this privilege. Legislators are immune
from the uninhibited discharge of their legisla-

tive duty, not for their private indulgence, but
for the public good. The privilege would be of
little value ifthey could be subjected to the cost
and inconvenience and distractions of a trial
upon the conclusions of the pleader, or the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a
jur/s speculation as to motives. Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 UJS. 367, 71 S. Ct 783, 95 L.
Ed. 1019 (1951).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am- Jur. 2d. — 72 Am. Jur. 2d States, Territories, and Dependencies § 55.

C.J.S. — 81A C J.S. States § 45.
Key Numbers. — States «= 28(2).

Sec. 9. [Compensation of legislators — Citizens' salary
commission.]
The Legislature shall not increase the salaries of its members on its own
initiative, but shall provide by law for the appointment by the Governor of a
citizens' salary commission to make recommendations concerning the salaries
of members of the Legislature. Upon submission of the commission's recommendations, the Legislature shall by law accept, reject or lower the salary but
may not, in any event, increase the recommendation. The Legislature shall
provide by law for the expenses of its members. Until salaries and expenses
enacted as authorized by this section become effective, members of the Legislature shall receive compensation of $25 per diem while actually in session,
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son might appeal as matter of right Jensen v. an entry of judgment, nor was it afi™»1judgNielsen, 22 Utah 2d 23, 447 P.2d 906 (1968). ment for purposes of appeal. Wilson v. ManOrder denying a motion for summary judg- ning, 645 P.2d 655 (Utah 1982); Utah State
ment was not afinalorder and was not appeal- Tax Comm'n v. Erekaon, 714 P2& 1151 (Utah
able. Denison v. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc., 1986); Sather v. Gross, 727 P.2d 212 (Utah
571 ?J2d 1359 (Utah 1977).
1986); Ahlstrom v. Anderson, 728 P.2d 979
A summary judgment in favor of one defen- (Utah 1986).
dant alone is not a final judgment where the
An unsigned minute entry does not constiaction against the remaining defendant re- tute afinalorder for purposes of appeal. State
mains alive. Neider v. State DOT, 665 P.2d v. Crowley, 737 P.2d 198 (Utah 1987).
1306 (Utah 1983).
Cited ^ Huaton y ^ ^
81g p ^
g31
Unsigned minute entry.
(Utah 1991); Boggs v. Boggs, 824 P.2d 478
An unsigned minute entry did not constitute (Utah Ct App. 1991).
COLLATERAL REFEHENCES
AJJEL — Appealability of order suspending
imposition or execution of sentence, 51
AXiUth 939.

Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of
entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1)
under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of
the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. •(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the
prescribed time maybe ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires.
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given
fii tha n+har nurtiM in accordance with the rules of nractice of the trial court.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
sion, on appeal. Glezos v. Frontier Inv., 896
ANALYSIS
P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct App. 1996).
—Amendment or modification of judgAdministrative actions.
ment
Attorney fees.
If an amendment or modification does not
Cross-appeal.
Extension of time to appeal.
change the substance or character of a judg—Amendment or modification of judgment.
ment, it does not enlarge the time for appeaL
Filing of notice.
Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct App.
Filing with comity clerk.
1994).
Final order or judgment.
Filing of notice.
Poet-judgment motions.
The mailing of a notice of appeal was not
Premature notice.
equivalent to a filing of notice of appeaL
Beconsideration of order.
Isaacson v. Dorius, 669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983).
Timeliness of notice.
Filing with county clerk.
Date of notice.
Filing with the county clerk was not a timely
Cited.
filing with the juvenile court, where there was
Administrative actions.
no indication when the clerk transmitted a
Subdivision (c) does not apply to petitums to copy of the notice of appeal to the juvenile
v
review of administrative actions. « t o ^ court, and the original was returned to appelCountry Stores, Inc. v. Industrud Comm'n, 860 lants counseL State, In re M.S., 781 P.2d 1287
PJJd 944 (Utah Ct App. 1993).
(Utah Ct App. 1989).
Attorney fees.
. ._, Final order or judgment
No cross-appeal is necessary where plaintoffc
Where the trial court signed two different
merely sought attorney's fees incurred in d* judgments but neither party served his prefending their judgment on appeal. Walks v. pared judgment on the other party before subT b o n 632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981).
mitting it to the court, the filing of either judgment would be erroneous, and an appeal taken
°SSSS^W
requires that a notice of from either is premature because the judgcross-appeal be timelyfiled.Absent a oross-ap- ments are not properly -final." Larsen v.
^ a respondent may not attuk the judg- Larsen, 674 P.2d 116 (Utah 1983).
ment of the court below. Henretty v. Mania
Juvenile court's order for temporary confine3 5 £Sni
F2d 506 (Utah 1990) (decided ment in a youth facility for observation and
S £ t e t a * r R. Utah S. Ct 4).
assessment prior to a final disposition was not
afinalorder, for purposes of appeal, because it
Extension of time to appeaL
I S
Rule 6(b), UJLCJ., grating the did not finally dispose of all issues, including
court power to extend a time limit where a&d- the rights of the juvenile and/or his mother's
ore tolct in time is due to excusable neglect rights as parental custodian. State, In re
S i g nor Rule 60(b)(1), UACLP., autho- TJD.C, 748 P.2d 201 (Utah Ct App.), cert deS i n g the court to reUeve from fin* judgment nied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
An unsigned minute" entry is not a final
forlnadvertence or excusable neglect applies
where a notice of appeal has not been timely judgment for purposes of appeal. A judgment
tolled by a timely post-judgment motion, starts
ESLWSSA
V. H3*m, 24 Utah 2d 120, 466
to run on the date when tie trial court enters
its first signed order denying the motion.
an appeal simply byfilinga ^ t ^ for Iteom- Gallardo v. Bolinder, 800 P.2d 816 (Utah
£ 5 t o of Order S t r i l ^ Petitionjmd Mo- 1990).
A signed minute entry ordering defendant's
L n for ReUeffromFinal J u ^ e n t . w Peay v.
counsel to prepare an order showing that plainieay, 607 PJ2d 841 (Utah 1980)
I S e n the question of -excusable negtect" tiffs post-judgment motions filed pursuant to
ariaes in a jurisdictional context, as opposed to Rules 52(b) and 59, U JLC.P., were denied was
a nonurisdictional context, the standard con- not aftn*1appealable order. Swenson Assoes.
temriated thereby is a strict one; it IS not Architects v. State, 254 Utah Adv. Bep. 9
m S t o c o v e r the usual excuse that the law- (Utah 1994).
yer is too busy, but is to cover emergency sitaa- Post-judgment motions.
S S d y . ^ w s w o o d , Inc. v. Mountaui Fuel
Where a post-judgment motion was timely
i S p l y Co. 676 P M 962 (Utah 1984).
filed under Rule 59(aX6), U JLCP., to upset the
Ths'tin*forfilingan appeal is junctional judgment and notices of appealfromthe judgand ordinarily cannot be enlarged. State v. ment werefiledafter the motion was made, but
before the disposition of the motion, the motion
Proner remedy of defendant whose <«ss-ap- rendered the notices of appeal ineffective, ana
oeal was not timelyfiledunder Subdivision (d), notice of appeal had to be filed within the re^ h a v i n g the n ^ r e t i ^
Motion to extend time with the distort court quired time from the date of the entry tba*
disposed of the motion. U-M Invs. v. Hay, 668
" " I T - . «. ._r
/-\- u . ^ MHWIIIAIA coart could
P.2d 1186 (Utah 1982).

